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INTEGRATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD
YARIV BRAUNER*

INTRODUCTION

During the second half of the last century, many countries
gradually replaced their so-called classical corporate tax regimes, under which corporate earnings were taxed twice once in the hands of the corporation, and again when distributed to corporate shareholders as dividends - with an integrated regime (imputation), which taxed such earnings only
once.1 The driving force behind this trend was the expectation of significant efficiency gains. This clear and gradual
trend has been abruptly reversed with the turn of the century.
The phenomenon we call globalization, and in particular the
proliferation of cross-border business and investment, has materially contributed to this dramatic sea change in the corporate tax world. The conventional wisdom was that imputation
is unsustainable in a world whose markets integrate. This article argues that the abandonment of imputation is partly a consequence of our essentially non-cooperative world in terms of
tax policy coordination. It concludes that imputation does not
have to be the victim of globalization - it can be retained to

the benefit of many countries, but only through enhanced international cooperation and coordination of tax policies.
The goal of integration is to alleviate the over ("double")
taxation of corporate profits, consequently reducing the effective tax rates on returns on investments through corporations. 2 Perhaps the most popular method used for this pur* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University College School
of Law. I thank Reuven Avi-Yonah, Adam Chodorow, Zohar Goshen, Jennifer MacDonald, John Steines and the participants of tax policy workshops
at the Universities of Michigan and Tel Aviv Law Schools for their useful
comments, assistance and support - All mistakes and inaccuracies are mine.
1. Any method that results in less than full double taxation could be
considered an integration method, however, this article focuses on imputa-

tion, both as a proxy for full integration (one level of tax) and because it was
the most dominant method of integration throughout the last century.
2. This could be achieved in various ways, with some different achievements, advantages and disadvantages in practice. This article focuses on the
method that was considered the most accurate and popular of all integration
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pose was the imputation method, which extended credits to
shareholders for the corporate income tax paid by a distributing corporation "on their behalf." The expectation of significant efficiency gains from its adoption was comfortably supported by economic theory. 4 However, in less than five years,
most of the countries that had adopted integration have rein5
troduced a second level of taxation on corporate profits.
This volteface does not reflect a rejection of the underlying economic principles supporting integration, but rather reflects a market change. In particular, increased international
trade has created pressure to eliminate cross-border discrimination by extending, inter alia, the benefits of integration to
foreigners and foreign investments. 6 The imputation method,
which was popular in a domestic context, could not be sustained as a purely domestic measure in a global economy, and
countries were not willing to extend its benefits across-borders. 7 This pressure was primarily significant in the European
Union (hereinafter "E.U."), whose institutions support harmonization (not only non-discrimination based reciprocity) of
methods - full imputation, as elaborated below. See MICHAEL J.

GRAETZ &
ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAXES:

THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE

REPORTS (1998) (an extensive review and analysis of the various integration
methods).
3. For example, with respect to their shareholding in the corporation
and the distributions made to them out of corporate profits.
4. CHARLES E. McLuRE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE?
(1979); Deborah H. Schenk, Foreword: Colloquium on CorporateIntegration, 47
TAX L. REV. 427 (1992); Graetz & Warren, supra note 2. Note that most of
the analysis was conducted assuming relatively closed markets, which was appropriate at the time. See, e.g., Robin W. Boadway, The Economic Rationale
for Integration, Address Before the Corporate Tax Management Conference
(1998), in BUSINESS TAX REFORM 21:1-26 (analyzing the international aspects
of integration in the context of a Canadian tax reform evaluation).
5. See infra Part II.C.

6. See Richard Vann, Trends in Company/Shareholder Taxation: Single or
Double Taxation, 88a CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 21, 24 (2003);

Reuven Avi-Yonah, Back to the 1930s? The Shaky Casefor Exempting Dividends,
97 TAX NOTES 1599 (2002).
7. This unwillingness arose from the conventions of the international
tax regime, which were premised on the classical system, and therefore did
not require such an extension, and from the understanding of some integration countries that unilateral extension of such benefits would amount to a
transfer to the treaty partner's fisc rather than the investors. See examples
infra Part II.B.
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member states' tax systems8 - a difficult task with the present
(allegedly discriminatory) integration rules in place. 9
Most imputation countries 10 chose therefore to replace
imputation with a hybrid system - a system which taxes dividends separately and without reference to the corporate tax
paid on corporate profits (similar to a classical system)," yet at
a reduced rate (below the normal individual tax rate).12 This
8. See, e.g., Joe Kirwin, Marks & Spencer Case DemonstratesNeed for Common
Tax Base in EU, Official Says, BNA's INT'L TAX MONITOR (Feb. 3, 2005) (citing, on the condition of anonymity, an E.U. commission official supporting
tax base harmonization, and evaluating whether it would be better to get
there directly, through member states' negotiation or with the pressure of
an ECJ decision to that effect).
9. See, e.g., Uwe Ilhi et al., Trends in Company/Shareholder Taxation: Single
or Double Taxation, 88a CAHIERS DE DROIT FIscAL INTERNATIONAL 71, 73
(2003).
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. This separate taxation of corporate earnings and corporate distributions is at the core of the classical system, which simply treats corporations as
"legal persons" separate from their shareholders for tax purposes. It accepts
this (corporate law) fiction, probably with the view that one of the obligations of a corporation as such is to pay taxes like any other (flesh and blood)
person. I find this acceptance quite odd, and I could not find any serious
discussion in support of such acceptance. It is, however, a widely-accepted
feature of tax law throughout the world, and its analysis and potential criticism are beyond the scope of this article. It is a worthwhile future project.
The formalistic justification was supplemented with various, more sophisticated justifications, which are, in fact, attempts to justify the corporate tax
itself as having a stand-alone justification, such as the capture of government
benefits that only corporations enjoy (See, e.g., Herwig Schlunk, I Come Not To
Praisethe CorporateIncome Tax, But To Save It, 56 TAX L. REv. 329 (2003)), of
certain corporate specific rents, and of corporate governance controls
(Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations,Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REv. 1193 (2004)). None of these, in my opinion, justifies the corporate tax that countries actually employ, and surely cannot justify the high rates of the separate corporate tax. Therefore, they cannot
justify the classical system.
12. At first glance the United States fits into this picture quite oddly. Its
corporate tax policy experienced a relevant sea change as well, but in the
opposite direction. For the first time, despite a notorious and long lasting
resistance to depart from the classical system, it effectively did just that in
2001. Prior to 1938, the U.S. tax system was not primarily classical, and included various levels and forms of integration. For the best and most concise review of these developments see John K. McNulty, A Brief Look at the
Early History of the Unintegrated Corporate and Individual Income Taxes in the
USA, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE TAXATION - ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
KLAUS VOGEL 163 (Kees van Raad ed., 2002). Like any other operating classi-
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"reduced rate" system survives the scrutiny of nondiscrimination and preserves "some" integration, thereby creating a reduced overall tax burden on corporate profits.' 3 The acceptance of the hybrid system proves that integration as a concept
was not rejected, but rather the particular use of imputation
for achieving integration was considered unsustainable.
The advent of this rough-justice integration method was
explained primarily by the aforementioned nondiscrimination
pressures, particularly in the E.U. context. This article offers
an additional, complementary explanation to this conventional wisdom, namely that integration, and particularly imputation, is indeed not sustainable in a globalizing world economy only so long as countries do not sufficiently cooperate in
coordination of their tax policies. It argues further that the
benefits of integration may be preserved through enhanced
international cooperation and coordination of tax polices.
Such an effort should, however, be made within the existing
international tax regime,14 which has evolved with globalization, but has always been largely premised on the classical syscal system, the U.S. System had various optional or partial regimes that resulted in at least partial integration for some income or some taxpayers. See,
e.g., id. at 174-75. Additionally, various so-called self-help integration
evolved, most notably since the enactment of the "check-the-box" regime.
This is a very significant turn in U.S. tax policy but, as demonstrated below, it
is not inconsistent with the global trend described above, and - it adopted a
similar policy measure - a reduced dividend rate system. The U.S. policy
change is noteworthy also because integration has been on the U.S. International tax policy agenda for almost half a century now but, despite a strong
consensus among experts and sometimes expectedly potent political support, the classical system remained a cornerstone of the U.S. federal income
tax. The resilience of the classical system was explained primarily by political and political economy reasons. SeeJennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss,
A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995). In addition,
the inherent conservatism among tax experts and legislators often lead to
additional difficulties in any attempt to reform tax laws. This is especially
true when the practice in question is as deep-rooted in practice as the classical system. The new U.S. rules were relatively easy to adopt, inter alia, because their "halfway" system may be perceived as very similar to the classical
system; it still taxes corporate distributions without any reference to the corporate (earnings) tax, albeit at a different rate.
13. See, e.g., infra Table II(A).

14. The international tax regime is embodied primarily in bilateral tax
treaties following the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter "OECD") model.
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tem.1 5 Despite the prominence of imputation systems in the
second half of the twentieth century, the international tax regime remained undeveloped and one-dimensional as far as
corporate taxation was concerned.
The choice of reduced dividends tax rate reflects a belief
that it was less difficult to coordinate tax policies this way, particularly because no reference between the corporate tax and
the tax on corporate distributions, which may be imposed in
different countries, was required. It also demonstrates a preoccupation of policy makers with the classical system as a logical "baseline," or default system despite the fact that it is really
just one pole of many reasonable policy options. These explanations for the hybrid system are not satisfactory, especially as
the effect of the interplay between different countries' tax policies on each other's policy choices is becoming increasingly
powerful. It would be desirable hence to rethink the disposition of the international tax regime with the classical system
anyway - preferably adjusting it to accommodate imputation
and the capture of its efficiency benefits.
The article first identifies and elaborates on this contemporary trend of conceding integration. 16 Part II discusses the
recent moves away from integration in some major economies,
and analyzes the reasons for such moves. It tracks them to the
international dimension of integration which has never been
comprehensively explored even in the golden era of imputation, a neglect which came back to haunt these economies at
17
the turn of the century.
Part III analyzes the international aspects of integration
and its affect on tax policies to date. It sets forth the argument
that current tax policies arise from the non-cooperative funda15. Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the
International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 TAX L. REv. 565 (1992).
16. See Vann, supra note 6, at 23 (the first significant statement of this
trend has probably been Professor Richard Vann's general report at the
Congress of the International Fiscal Association on the subject).
17. The international aspects of taxation were neglected in the bulk of
the analysis of integration, which concentrated primarily on domestic aspects. See id. at 24. The few authors who explored the international aspects
of integration include: Richard M. Bird, InternationalAspects of Integration, 28
NAT'L TAx J. 302 (1975); Richard Vann, InternationalImplications of Imputation, 2 AUSTL. TAX F. 451 (1985); Ault, supra note 15; Douglas R. Fletcher,
The InternationalArgument for Corporate Tax Integration, 11 Am. J. TAx POL'Y
155 (1994).
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mental features of the current international tax regime. As retaliation and undesirable spillovers became more significant
and material, it was not sufficient that integration was considered the most desirable policy from a domestic perspective,
since the potential revenue flight that resulted from integration made it an undesirable policy overall.
Part IV concludes with a suggestion that enhanced international cooperation and coordination of tax policies may allow countries to pursue integration while minimizing the
problems of revenue flight risk or retaliation that plagued the
imputation systems. Such cooperation could enable countries
to capture many of the efficiency gains associated with the
8
lower effective tax rates under integration regimes.'
18. This exposure is an interesting, but not unique example of a fundamental tension in international tax policy that globalization brought to the
center stage, namely the revenue flight tension; the other is the multinational enterprise (hereinafter "MNE") tension. I elaborated on these tensions elsewhere. Yariv Brauner, Taxing Cross-BorderMergers & Acquisitions,
2004 FLA. TAx REv. 953 (2004). The revenue flight dilemma arises from the
non-cooperative features of the international tax world. Professor Avi-Yonah
has compared this problem, in the context of withholding tax on interest, to
a "stag hunt" game, where all the participants avoid initiating cooperative
action through unilateral measures to the detriment of them all. See Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 -ARv. L. REv. 1573, 1583 (2000). A country may wish to promote
certain policies, but it is not completely free to do so since other countries
may respond in a way that will either circumvent such policies or result in a
revenue flight from that country. Countries try therefore to optimize their
policies and adopt "coherent" tax rules that ameliorate the risks of retaliation and circumscription, including some limited coordination efforts,
mainly through BTT. The MNE tension arises from the fiction of the corporation as a separate legal personality and our inability to identify the incidences of the corporate income tax. In the economic reality MNEs perform
as single firms, doing business (worldwide) in the global market. The legal
reality ignores this economic reality and attributes "separateness" to the (economically) inseparable parts of this firm, and only to these parts that the
firm itself elected to present as separable. Very little legal scholarship has
been written about this tension. In a recent working paper, Professor AviYonah lays a conceptual model for analyzing the application of national laws
to MNEs. He does not, however, focus on tax in the version available at the
time this article is written. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of
MultinationalEnterprises:An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality,and Harmonization (U. Mich. Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 00-01,
2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNID3232
24_code020812630.pdfPabstractid=323224. Tax law, in particular, is primarily domestic, and severely suffers from this tension. I find it useful to ex-

20051

INTEGRA770N IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD

II.
THE RISE AND FALL OF INTEGRATION

A.

Integration in Theory

A considerable amount of economic and legal writing has
explored the advantages and disadvantages of integration in
its various forms.' 9 The focus of this literature has been unequivocally on the efficiency benefits of integration, arguing
that integration relieves some major distortions that arise from
the fiction that corporations are separate legal "persons" and
the extension of this fiction to tax law through a separate corporate income tax. Without integration, i.e., under a "classical" system, the corporate tax imposes a "double tax" (which is
a popular name for the economic distortion created by the
separate taxation of corporate earnings and corporate distributions; "double tax" because such a tax system over-taxes
such investments in comparison to equivalent investments
through non-incorporated entities, such as partnerships and
sole-proprietorships) on income from investments through
corporations. This distortion creates a bias against the use of
the corporate form and a disincentive to invest in new corporate equity. 20 The bias is not one dimensional, however, since
it depends on the tax rates involved and other rules that may
affect one's choice of business form, such as the exclusive permission for corporations to not distribute their profits annuplain the effects of globalization on international taxation with these two
fundamental tensions. In the case of integration, the tension is between the
intention to adopt the most desirable policy domestically (integration) and
the reluctance to do so due to an increased risk of revenue flight, to which it
exposes the adopting country. Vann, supra note 6, at 24. The MNE tension
is more complex. The redeployment of cash and property within the enterprise may be desirable on efficiency grounds, and dividends are the most
straightforward way to do that. Nonetheless, the home country of the enterprise and the country in which the cash or property arose (the "source"
country in the international tax lingo) divide the rights to tax any income
related to these cash and property on bases other than efficiency. The international convention in this regard follows the "separateness" fiction, totally
ignoring the existence of MNEs.
19. And, therefore, it is not for this article to comprehensively review it.
Most of the conclusions of this literature, however, are mentioned in this
article where it is appropriate to make its point. Good reviews of the economic and legal literature regarding integration include: GRAETZ & WARREN, supra note 2; Vann, supra note 6.
20. See McLuRE, supra note 4.
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ally, namely deferral, which encompasses timing benefits.
Deferral and the additional layer of corporate income tax, together with other, less significant rules, distort the choice of
business form in opposite directions and deliver a schizophrenic "tax message" to the relevant decision makers. 21 The
other side of this message is that taxpayers turn it into an opportunity and exploit these opposing rules for their own tax
planning purposes.
Another major distortion of the classical system resulting
from the same mixed signals is that it encourages inefficient
retention of profits by the corporation. 2 2 This distortion of
the choice between retention and distribution of corporate
earnings has been particularly popular in the debate, used by
integration proponents as an argument in the context of economic stimulation and growth.
Selective deferral and the additional layer of corporate
tax do not begin to describe the schizophrenia of present corporate tax systems. For instance, dividend distributions are
typically not deductible for the distributing corporation,
whereas interest is. This fact makes dividends even less popular. This differential treatment distorts the financing decisions
of corporations, encouraging them to retain earnings or raise
capital in debt rather than equity form, which may result in
over-leveraging of corporations, increased borrowing costs,
and the potential risk of excessive collapses and bankrupt23
cies.
The effect of these distortions was considered to be material. The U.S. Treasury Report of 1992 estimated that moving
to integration would result in welfare gains of approximately
21. In reality, the system may be even more complex, as iterated by
Graetz with respect to the U.S. classical system in which "corporate income is
sometimes taxed twice in the U.S., sometimes once, and sometimes not at
all." GRAETZ & WARREN, supra note 2, at 53.
22. See McLuRE, supra note 4. The incentives in this regard depend also
on the relative tax rates on corporations, shareholders and capital gains. If
the latter are low, as they have traditionally been in the U.S., and corporate
tax rates are also low relatively to the individual tax rates, a strong incentive
to retain earnings is created.

23. Id. Other tax-advantaged forms of corporate distributions may also
be preferred to dividends in a classical system. The classic example for this
distortion in the U.S. has been the preference of stock repurchases resulting
in lower-taxed capital gains rather than ordinary income (dividends).
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$2.5 billion to $25 billion per year in 1992 dollars.2 4 A word of
caution is due, however, since these estimates are very difficult
to make and are highly sensitive to the modeling methods, the
methods of integration to which the classical system is compared, and their specific details. 25 Moreover, the "new" view
of dividends in the finance literature cast doubt over these results, since according to this view (at least most of) the corporate income tax is capitalized into share prices by the capital
markets, and therefore, the efficiency gains mentioned above
should be significantly lower. 26 Additionally, the classical system alone is not responsible for these distortions.
Although fewer discussions were devoted to the effect of
the corporate tax system on corporate governance, a few scholars commented on the potential benefits of integration in that
context. The most obvious benefit is that integration removes
the tax incentive (or excuse) for retention, resulting in a likely
increase in management discipline. 2 7 Professors Arlen and
Weiss argued that the resilience of the classical system can only
be fully explained by the different objectives of managers and
shareholders - the former pursuing primarily new investments
and use for the retained earnings trapped in the corporation
as a result of the double taxation of corporate profits rules,
and the latter also pursuing higher returns on old investment,
which are not fulfilled due to the above tax trap. 28 Integration
should remove this trap and consequently align the interests
of managers and shareholders. Professor Zohar Goshen noted
that integration would eliminate the tax distortion of dividend
policy (essentially the bias resulting from the deferral opportunity and the effective preferential taxation of capital gains),
24. GRAETZ & WARREN, supranote 2. But see Reed H. Shuldiner, Commentary, Corporate Integration:Do the Uncertainties Outweigh the Benefits? 47 TAX L.
Rxv. 653 (doubting the magnitude of these efficiency gains).
25. But, the treasury report mentions that "one striking feature of the

calculations is that within each model, and for a given financing assumption,
structurally different [integration] prototypes often have similar overall effects on economic well-being." GRAETZ & WARREN, supra note 2.
26. See, e.g., Auerbach infra note 133.
27. An interesting recent perspective of this behavior pattern is given by
Mihir A. Desai et al., Dividend Policy Inside the Firm (EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings
Presented Paper, Working Paper, March 2003), availableat http://ssrn.com/
abstract=317040 (exploring dividend policies of foreign affiliates to multinational parents - hence "inside the firm").
28. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 12, at 327.
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ensuing in reduction of agency costs through the shift of con29
trol over dividend policy to the capital markets.
Despite the focus of the literature on efficiency, integration may have other important consequences. Although not
inevitable, most switches to integration resulted in revenue
losses, as predicted. The distributional aspects of the switch to
integration were also cast in doubt. Distributional consequences of integration are difficult to determine, particularly
because a comparison must be made with the distributional
consequences of the classical system, which themselves are
controversial. A Treasury integration report found only slight
distributional effects in the switch to integration.3 0 For the
purposes of this article, I take these results at face value since
the question of distribution should be addressed locally, considering traditions and social policies that differ from one
country to another. These effects should not affect the principal question of whether to adopt integration, but rather the
actual method and level of integration chosen.
Finally, some countries had additional reasons to adopt
integration, as elaborated on later in this section. 3 1 In general, it is fair to say that some imputation systems partially succeeded in achieving their goals. 32 This less than hoped for
success was often attributed to unrelated, contradictory gov33
ernment policies, which negated the effects of integration.
As explored below, countries were not typically discouraged by
integration in general, but instead replaced imputation with a
reduced-rate system, and some major countries preserved imputation despite the global trend away from it.
B.

Integration in Numbers - Current Rules

Some benefits of integration are easy to identify in the
following simplified numeric example. In Table I, two prototypical integration methods - imputation and dividend ex29. Zohar Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 YALE L.J. 881, 915

(1995).
30. GRAETZ & WARREN, supra note 2, at 19.

31. See infra Part I.C.
32. For a recent study see Andrew Prevost, Ramesh P. Rao & John D.
Wagster, Dividend Imputation and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of New Zealand,
29J. Bus. FIN. & Acc. 1079 (2002).

33. See infra Part II.C.
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emption 34 - are compared to each other and to the baseline
classical system, using tax rates roughly equivalent to the cur35
rent relevant U.S. Tax rates:
TABLE 1
Classical

Imputation

Div. Exemption

Corporation level tax
Corporate income
Corporate tax (35%)
Corporate income after tax

100
35
65

100
35
65

100
35
65

Shareholder level tax
Dividend distribution
Gross-up for corporate tax paid
Individual income
40% Individual tax

65
65
26

65
35
100
40

65
0
-

Imputation credit

-

35

-

Net shareholder tax

26

5

0

Total tax:
Shareholder income after tax

61
39

40
60

35
65

It is clear from this example that there is no difference
between these methods at the corporate level. 3 6 It is also clear

that the overall tax burden that the classical system imposes on
investment through corporations, as long as earnings are not
retained, is significantly higher than the burden imposed by
the other methods, or the burden on investment in non-incorporated entities, which should be similar to that of the imputation system. Most corporations, however, take advantage of
deferral opportunities (not available to non-incorporated entities), so the difference in burden may be, in reality, much
smaller, or even reversed. 3 7 This fact, however, does not make
the comparison useless because deferral also potentially repre34. These are also the methods recommended in the two major U.S. integration proposals prepared in the early 1990's. GRAETZ & WARREN, supra
note 2.
35. Note that these rates are not far from the normal level in most important economies, as will be further emphasized below.
36. In the past, another method, usually called the split-rate method was
in use, notably in Germany, with respect to which that would not be true. See
infra Part II.C.1.
37. It depends on the relevant corporate and individual tax rates and the
duration of deferral.
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sents the distortion of the choice between retention and distribution of earnings; it does make the differences in the nominal tax burdens less significant than the raw numbers above.
Finally, the difference between imputation and dividend exemption simply represents the difference between the corporate tax rate and the shareholder tax rate used in the example.38 The core difference between these methods is that imputation ensures taxation at the individual tax rate and
dividend exclusion ensures taxation at the corporate tax rate.
In most countries, (domestic) dividend income in the
hands of foreigners, as well as income from investments of
(domestic) residents in foreign enterprises, faced the classical
system even in countries where integration was used domestically.3 9 Table II(A) illustrates the tax consequences of investment in a corporation organized and operating in a classical
system country:
A classical source country collects, therefore, its full corporate tax and acceptable 40 withholding tax regardless of the
method of taxation used in the residence country. Moreover,
all investment in domestic corporations, including domestic
investment, faces the same tax. All shareholders face at least
44.75% tax, and imputation country investors even face the
61% tax, equivalent to classical system countries' investors.
Note that a new method is introduced in this table - the reduced tax rate on dividends, which is a relaxed version of the
dividend exclusion method, and whose consequences in the
table above are identical to a dividend exclusion method, excluded here for brevity. In policy terms, the classical country
ensures, under current policy, capital export neutrality (here38. If, for instance, we used an individual tax rate equal to the corporate
tax rate, which is a standard policy advice - to make the top marginal rate
equal to the corporate tax rate in order to ameliorate incentives to do business or invest through a corporate or a non-incorporated form - there
would really be no difference between the consequences of these two methods.
39. See Seppo Kari &Juoko Yla-Liedenpohja, ClassicalCorporation Tax as a

Global Means of Tax Harmonization 1-2 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 665, 2002), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=301501.
40. The normal treaty rate for portfolio investment is 15%. See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Articles from the Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capita4 art. 10, Jan.28, 2003,

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/34/1914467.pdf.
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TABLE

Investor country

Source country (classical)
Corporate income
35% corporate tax
After-tax corporate income
Withholding tax if distributed
(15%)
Residence country
Dividend (grossed up)
40% Individual tax
Imputation credit

Foreign tax credit
Residual residence country
tax
Result
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax
Revenue split
Source country
Residence country

Classical

II(A)
Imputation
Foreign
Domestic
investment investment

Reduced rate
(15% on
dividends)

100
35
65

100
35
65

100
35
65

100
35
65

9.75

9.75

-

9.75

65
26

65
26

100
40

-

35

-

65
65*15%=9.75
-

9.75

9.75

-

16.25

16.25

5

0

61
39

61
39

40
60

44.75
55.25

44.75
16.25

44.75
16.25

40

44.75
0

9.75

inafter "CIN") 41 - completely with respect to imputation countries and at least minimally as far as dividend tax relaxation
42
methods are concerned.
Table II(A) presents a portfolio investment scenario. The
consequences are conceptually identical, however, with respect to direct investment (investment in a residence, rather
than a source country corporation doing business in the
source country). In that case, the residence country tentatively
taxes the same corporate income, yet provides relief - typically
41. The goal of CIN is to eliminate tax wedges between domestic and
foreign investments domestically. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Taxing InternationalIncome: InadequatePrinciples, Outdated Concepts, and UnsatisfactoryPolicies,
54 TAx L. REV. 261, 270-71 (2000).
42. I call it minimal CIN because it can only ensure CIN regarding the
investment in the domestic corporation. There will most probably be differences in effective tax rates on the investment as a whole due to full taxation
of the dividends in the residence countries using classical or imputation
methods and no or partial taxation of such dividends in the countries using
dividend tax relaxation methods.
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through an indirect foreign tax credit. There is usually a difference in withholding tax rates (5% rather than 15%) 4 3 and
in corporate tax rates that could result in additional tax in the
residence country but which do not change any of the policy
44
consequences.
Switching to the investor (residence) country perspective,
it is apparent that current rules provide a disincentive to invest
abroad.45 An investor from a classical method jurisdiction
faces the same level of tax in another classical jurisdiction, but
she relinquishes most of that tax in a foreign country. 4 6 An
investor from an imputation country clearly faces a much
higher tax than she would have faced at home even if no distribution is made, most of which is paid to a foreign country. An
investor from a reduced-rate country faces similar levels of tax,
all or most of which are paid to a foreign country. The difference between domestic investment and investment in a classical country for such investor depends on the level of dividend
taxes used. Complete dividend exemption would leave the
consequences unchanged, yet the burden higher (by the WHlT
rate) than that of a domestic investment. Any effective tax on
dividends makes this difference smaller, and if the rate equals
or exceeds the WHT rate, then there is no difference between
domestic and foreign investment. In conclusion, from a capital export neutrality (hereinafter "CEN") 47 perspective, the
biggest effect of the current rules is on imputation country investors in a classical country corporation. Other classical
countries, as well as reduced-rate countries, are essentially unaffected. The latter are able to both maintain CEN and capture at least some of the benefits of integration by reducing
43. See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Articles from the Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,art.
10, Jan. 28, 2003, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/34/1914467.pdf.
44. Additionally, the withholding tax may be replaced by a branch tax or
any equivalent version.
45. That is true from out narrow perspective, ignoring phenomena such
as: deferral, tax rate differences, tax evasion and tax havens.
46. This may, or may not matter to her. There may also be other, unrelated, reasons why it may be desirable to such investor to invest domestically
or not.
47. Aiming at eliminating tax incentives from a decision to export or not
to export capital (invest abroad). See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 42, at 270-72
(containing a good discussion of this standard).
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the effective tax rate on these investments (from 61 to 44.75 in
the above example).
The next example, in Table II(B) illustrates the tax consequences of investments in a corporation organized and doing
business in an imputation system country (compared with domestic investment):
TABLE
Investor country

Source country (Imputation)
Corporate income
35% corporate tax
After-tax corporate income
Withholding tax if distributed
(15%)
Residence country
Dividend (grossed up)
40% Individual tax
Imputation credit
Foreign tax credit
Residual residence country
tax
Result
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax
Revenue split
Source country share
Residence country share

II(B)

Classical
Foreign
Domestic
investment investment

Imputation
Foreign
Domestic
investment
investment

100
35
65
9.75

--

9.75

16.25

26

16.25

61
39

61
39

61
39

44.75
16.25

61

44.75
16.25

65
26
9.75

An imputation source country does not follow CIN. In
most cases it collects more tax from foreign investors than the
total tax imposed on its own investors (44.75% v. 40% in our
example)

.48

A classical country investor in an imputation country corporation faces the same tax consequences she would have
faced at home or in an equivalent investment in another classical country. The revenue split is no different from the one in
another classical (or relaxed dividend tax) method country.
The classical residence country, therefore, preserves CEN
48. The only case where that would not be true is when the individual tax
exceeds the corporate tax significantly. Even then it is likely that the investor faces additional tax at home which will increase the effective tax on the
investment.
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under current rules regardless of the method used by the
source country.
An imputation country investor is not better off investing
in another imputation country - she faces similar tax consequences to investment in a classical or other (reduced dividend rate) countries. Consequently, current rules are CEN inconsistent from an imputation country perspective regardless
of the method used in the source country. Similarly, for a reduced-rate country, the method used in the source country is
not a concern - its investors face the same consequences and it
faces the same revenue split regardless of that method, which
is why a column that duplicated these consequences (see Table II(A)) was omitted from Table II(B).
In conclusion, as was explored and demonstrated earlier,
the current international tax norms, and particularly the bilateral tax treaties based international tax regime are conceptually constructed on the premises of the classical system. 49 As
long as corporate tax rates are relatively similar among treaty
partners, 50 classical countries maintain CEN relatively well.
They also by and large maintain CIN - they succeed, at least,
in collecting a large portion of the tax at source - corporate
tax, plus withholding or branch tax rates, according to acceptable treaty norms. Imputation countries do not maintain CEN
under current rules regardless of the method used by the
source country. Their investors are leaving more tax in the
source jurisdiction than they would have paid at home on domestic investments, and overall, they basically face classical system tax burdens. In most cases, imputation countries also do
not maintain CIN under current rules. They often collect
more taxes from foreigners at source than they would have collected from their investors on the whole investment, "showing"
all foreign investors its "classical face."
Finally, the consequences of investment in country employing a reduced-rate method, the adoption of which is the
trend explored in this article, are demonstrated in Table
II(C):
49. Vann, supra note 6.
50. Corporate tax rates show tendency to converge worldwide. The classic example was the global adjustment to the U.S. dramatic reduction of its
corporate tax rates in 1986.
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TABLE

11(C)

Domestic
investment
Investor country method:
Source country (reduced rate
Corporate income
35% corporate tax
After-tax corporate income
Withholding tax (15%)
Residence country
Dividend (grossed up if
relevant)
Individual (dividend) tax
Direct foreign tax credit
Residual residence country tax
Result
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax
Revenue split
Source country share
Residence country share

Classical

Foreign
investment
Imputation Reduced rate

100
35
65

65
9.75

44.75

55.25
-

44.75

65
26
9.75
16.25

65
26
9.75
16.25

61
39

61
39

44.75
55.25

44.75

44.75

16.25

16.25

44.75
0

A reduced-rate country ensures, therefore, that all investment through domestic corporations leaves the same (44.75%
in our example) tax at source. Investors from other reducedrate countries should not incur additional tax at home, except
from differences in individual (dividend) tax rates. Under
current rules, investors from other countries face higher levels
of taxation - those typical in a classical system. So, within its
jurisdiction, CIN is well maintained, and only imputation
countries' investors face an inherent disincentive to invest in
reduced-rate countries in comparison to domestic investment.
This disincentive is not, however, unique to reduced-rate
countries as demonstrated in Tables II(A)&(B). CEN in also
basically maintained by reduced-rate countries, yet they typically do not collect much tax from such foreign corporate investments of their residents. Under current rules, the policies
of reduced rate countries reflect strong adherence to source
taxation.
Because reduced rate does not require linkage between
the corporate and shareholder level taxes, it fits well into the
scheme of the current classical system based international tax
rules, yet it succeeds in achieving integration both at the domestic and international levels. These simplistic examples
demonstrate the appeal of this method for countries that
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found integration desirable, but could not cope with the difficulties that imputation faced under current rules - also
demonstrated in the above examples. Theory becomes reality
in the next section, which reviews the actual trend away from
imputation.
C.

The Rise of Integration in the Second Half of the 20th Century

This section puts the above theoretical literature in a
chronological and country-specific context in order to demonstrate the prominence of integration and the widespread belief in its merits - especially the efficiency merits of imputation
systems - in the second half of the 20th century. The purpose
of this concise, and by no means comprehensive, comparative
survey is to concretize and establish appreciation for the rise of
integration, as it is essential for appreciating the significance
of its abrupt fall at the turn of the century.
1.

Germany

Germany first introduced modern 5 integration in 1953,
enacting its unique split-rate system, which taxed corporate
earnings designated for distribution more lightly than retained corporate earnings. 52 This remains the primary example for integration at the corporate level despite its subsequent
repeal - an apparently unpopular method of integration regardless of its theoretical efficiency appeal.5 3 The source of
this method is in post-war Germany, whose stock market was at
a very low point. Integration, especially at the corporate level,
51. Older forms of income taxes included some forms of integration as
well, for various reasons that will not be analyzed in this article. See, e.g.,
McNulty, supra note 12, at 163 (explaining the case of U.S. income taxes).
52. Harry G. Gourevitch, Corporate Tax Integration: The European Experience, 31 TAX LAw 65, 68-69 (1977).

53. Integration at the corporate level eliminates or reduces the additional level of tax on earnings of the legal fiction we call corporation. It
provides a better chance of achieving complete integration - equal taxation
of all investors in corporations at the investors' rates. It is unpopular because the adoption of this method reduces the corporate tax burden to all
investors, domestic and foreigners, and there is no reciprocal adjustment
required from the foreign residence country. The concern is that such a
system will result in a sheer transfer from the source country's fisc to that of
the residence country and no additional benefits.
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to revive investors' interests
was believed to have the potential
54
in German corporate equity.

In 1976 (effective as of January 1, 1977), Germany conceded corporate level integration and switched to a full imputation, shareholder level integration. This major policy reform
was not backed with clear goals except for the general belief in
55
the need to relieve double taxation on distributed earnings.
The reform came in response to certain shortcomings of the
split-rate system: the (tax) bias in favor of debt financing over
equity financing, the possible reluctance of majority shareholders to distribute earnings (which were still taxed at more
than 50%, in sharp contrast to the interests of minority shareholders, therefore, having no interest to invest, similar to the
non-rich parts of the population), and the different tax treatment of incorporated and unincorporated businesses. 56 The
imputation credit was not extended to foreign investors. Germany continued to tax foreign investors on dividends received
from German corporations through withholding tax imposed
at the relevant treaty rates. In general, integration achieved
little more than its direct consequence of reduction of tax
rates on (mainly German) investments in German corporations. 57 It is possible that this lack of success should be attributed to unrelated, but contradictory in consequence, government policies. As demonstrated below, this is a common pattern in many of the jurisdictions reviewed here.
The different treatment of foreign shareholders in German corporations caused some difficulties, especially with Germany's non-discrimination obligations toward other European
member states. Germany addressed these difficulties by allowing residents of these countries to apply for a refund of the
corporate tax equal to the imputation credit. This refund,
54. Gourevitch, supra note 52, at 69.
55. Id. at 69-70 (citing the Ministry of Finance technical memorandum
which accompanied the legislation specifically rejecting a general theory
that it is unjustified to tax business entities separately). See also Paul
Franken, The Germany Report, in INTERNATIONAL FISCAL ASSOCIATION, IMPUTATION SYSTEMS - OBJECTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES,

at 36 (IFA Congress Seminar

Series No. 7, 1982). Other goals mentioned were: the improvement of debtto-equity ratios of German corporations and the performance of the stock
market.
56. Gourevitch, supra note 52, at 70-71.
57. Franken, supa note 56, at 40.
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nevertheless, was principally subject to a withholding tax of
25%. This meant that the discrimination was ameliorated, but
not eliminated. In 2001, the imputation system was repealed
in Germany as part of a large corporate tax reform, and it returned to a supposedly classical system; in fact, a 25% flat-rate
corporate tax with 100% dividend exclusion for corporate
shareholders and 50% dividend exclusion for (German) individual shareholders - effectively a reduced (half) rate system.
No comprehensive explanations or studies accompanied this
amendment, although it is believed to be the product of the
difficulty of adapting imputation to international business and
58
the perceived complexity of the system.
2.

France

France introduced integration in 1965, when it replaced
its classical system with a partial imputation system, granting
shareholders a tax credit of half the dividend amount ("Avoir
Fiscal").59 The original principal objective of this reform was
(similarly to Germany) to revamp the French stock market. 60
Moreover, the high corporate tax rate in France compared to
other major European countries resulted in an incentive for
French investors to invest in foreign corporations and deter
foreigners from investing in French corporations. The resulting low valuations of French corporations exposed them to
foreign takeover. 6 1 The 1965 reform effectively reduced the
corporate tax on distributed earnings to comparable levels
with France's competitors (mainly Germany).62 The reform
did not change distribution patterns, resulting in what seemed
58. The amendment is reported to be generally favorably accepted in
Germany despite its undesirable expected efficiency and distributional consequences. See generally Dieter Endres & Andreas Oestreicher, 2001 Tax Reform in Germany - Planningfor a New Era, 28 INTERTAx 408 (2000); Christiana
Djanani & Ralf Herbener, Trends in Company/Shareholder Taxation: Single or
Double Taxation, 88a CAHIERS DE DROIT FiscAL INTERNATIoNAL 399, 434-35

(2003).
59. This was complemented by an equalization tax (precompte mobilier)
paid by corporations whose incomes had not been subject to the corporate
tax. For the best review of this law see Gourevitch, supra note 52, at 67.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 68.
62. Id. Other measures were taken to assist French corporations to build
up their retained earnings, which allegedly eliminated a tax bias between
them and distributions. See Pierre F. Fontaneau, France'sReport, in INTERNA-
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to be satisfactory reduction
of the tax burden on investments
63
in French corporations.

One of the major proponents of integration, France also
extended integration to foreign interests through its tax treaties. 64 Towards the end of the last century it became apparent
that, with economic globalization, both the amount of imputation credits extended to foreigners and equalization tax collected increased significantly, and the administrative costs of
maintaining the system became considerable. 65 This created
pressure for reform, where the administrative costs and industry's dislike of the equalization tax played a major role. 66 As a
result, as of 2001, France began, in a sequence of tax bills, to
reduce the corporate tax burden and the rate of the imputation credit allowed (though in a gradual manner), and finally
abolished the credit (and the equalization tax) as of 2004.67
The imputation system has been replaced by a reduced (half)
dividend tax rate system, none of whose benefits are extended
68
to foreigners.

TIONAL FIsCAL ASSOCIATION, IMPUTATION SYSTEMS -

OBJECTIVES AND CONSE-

at 33 (IFA Congress Seminar Series No. 7, 1982).
63. See Gourevitch, supra note 52, at 68; see also Fontaneau, supra note 62,
at 34 (An ancillary objective - to attract more investment in corporate stock
by small (family) investors - has not been successful despite additional incentives, such as tax exemption for capped amounts of dividends paid to
individuals. The reasons for this failure, similarly to other countries, are
other, unrelated government policies that created opposite incentives).
64. See, e.g., Ault, supra note 15, at 585 (this practice included the treaty
with the U.S; however, in some treaties, France effectively eliminated the
withholding tax on dividends - for example, the France-Bahrain treaty included a refund of the equalization tax to Bahrainian shareholders).
65. Philippe Derouin, Trends in Company/Shareholder Taxation: Single or
Double Taxation, 88a CAHIERS DE DROIT FIscAL INTERNATIONAL 375, 376
(2003).
66. Interestingly, the extension of the credit to foreigners was not considered to be a major concern. Id. at 395.
67. See, e.g., Ambroise Bricet, France's 2004 Finance Act, Amended 2003 Finance Act Change Tax Rules for Businesses, Shareholders,TAx ANALYSTS: WORLDWIDE TAx DAILY (Jan. 7, 2004) (LEXIS, 2004 WTD 4-5).
68. See, e.g., id. (no structured reduction of withholding tax rates on dividends).
QUENCES,
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The United Kingdom

The British corporate tax system adopted its modern integration method in 1972. 69 This was an imputation system
where corporations were obliged to pay an advanced corporate tax ("ACT") on distributed earnings. This ACT was
granted as a credit to the shareholders and also deducted from
the corporation's general (corporate) tax liability, which was
collected separately.7 0 Despite a strong opposition, the conservative government promoted this reform in the name of efficiency, believing it to remove the well-known distortions of
the corporate tax, and revive the capital markets. 7 1 These
goals have not been achieved generally, due mainly to contradictory effects of other, unrelated government policies.7 2 The
U.K. was really the leader of the reversal trend, repealing ACT
as of 1999 and reducing the credit granted significantly, and
practically eliminating most of the benefits of integration from
y3
foreigners.
4.

Italy

Italy adopted a full imputation system in 1977 primarily
for efficiency reasons.74 Early reports attributed partial success
to the system. Similar to other countries, some of the failure
was attributed to reasons unrelated to integration itself. As of
2004, Italy replaced its imputation system with an (almost full)
dividend exemption system. The stated reasons for this reform has been the other E.U. members' pressure on the basis
69. It had had an integration system prior to 1966 as well, replaced by a
classical system until 1972.
70. Gourevitch, supra note 52, at 71-72.
71. Id. at 71. It is interesting to mention that the U.K. had adopted a
classical system just 7 years prior to that, under a labor government, in sup-

port of a build-up of retained earnings.
72. Stanley H. Wright, The UK.Report, in INTERNATIONAL FIsCAL AssocIAOBJECTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES, at 51-52 (IFA
Congress Seminar Series No. 7, 1982).
73. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2000-13, 2000-6 I.R.B. 515.
74. Siegfried Mayr, Italy's report, in INTERNATIONAL FIsCAL ASSOCIATION,
IMPUTATION SYSTEMS - OBJECTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES, at 43 (IFA Congress
Seminar Series No. 7, 1982).
TION, IMPUTATION SYSTEMS -
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of non-discrimination (the E.U. free movement of capital prin75
ciple), and the complexity of the imputation system.
5.

Norway and Finland

Finland was late to adopt integration because of some distinct structural characteristics of its markets and the role of
corporate taxation until the 1980's.76 In 1990, it introduced a

full imputation system, and consequently, significantly reduced the corporate tax rate.7 7 Despite expectations that the
imputation credit would be extended across borders, this has
been done only sparingly and through tax treaties. 78 Other
treaties resulted only in a reduction or elimination of the withholding tax on dividends, 79 which was, it is important to note,
a halfway extension of integration across-borders. Finland
found it difficult to coordinate its imputation system with
other countries in a more fine-tuned way.8 0 In 2002, however,
the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court asked the ECJ
whether this non-perfect extension of the imputation system
across borders violated Finland's E.U. obligations8 " The background for this referral was in other cases that successfully
2
challenged a domestic application of integration in Europe.
The Finnish government expected to lose this case, which it
did, and was ready with a study and a reform proposal to abol75. Giuseppe Marino & Andrea Ballancin, The InternationalEffects of Italian Corporate Tax Reform, 2004 WTD 150-14, Aug. 4, 2004.
76. Matti Halen, Trends in Company/Shareholder Taxation: Single or Double

Taxation, 88a

CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 351,

351-52 (2003).

77. Implementing what is known as the dual income tax system typical to
the Scandinavian countries. See Alessandro Bavila, Moving Away from Global
Taxation: Dual Income Tax and Other Forms of Taxation, 41 EUR. TAX'N 211, 211

(2001).
78. Halfn, supra note 76, at 359 (the Finland-Ireland treaty).
79. See, e.g., 1953 Income Tax Convention, U.K.-Greece, art. XIVJune 25,
1953, 190 U.N.T.S. 281.
80. Hal~n, supra note 77, at 359-60. This is a good source for exploring
the practical reasons for the difficulty of extending imputation credits
across-borders because the author was a government official.
81. Case C 319/02, Manninen, [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 40 (2004).
82. Case C 35/98, Staatssecretarisvan Financin v. B.M.G. Verkooijen, 2000
E.C.R. 14071, 1-4130 to 33, which did not involve an integration system, but
rather a Dutch (the prototypical classical system country) dividend exemption provision and Case C 334/02 Commission v. French Republic, [2005] 2
C.M.L.R. 24 (2005).
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ish the imputation system and replace it with a reduced divi83
dend tax rate system.
Norway, though not an E.U. member, went through a very
similar experience. It originally introduced the imputation
system in 1992, without apparent success beyond the reduction of the tax burden on investments through corporations.
A recent case challenged the validity of this system, whose benefits were not extended to foreign investors in Norwegian corporations, and was directed (for advice) to the EFTA court,
which predictably ruled the Norwegian withholding tax on dividends paid by Norwegian corporations to foreigners (without
imputation credits) discriminatory. 84 The Norwegian government, similar to the Finnish government, predicted the outcome and proposed to abolish the imputation system and replace it with a reduced dividend tax rate system.8 5 Taken together, the Manninen and Fokus Bank cases reject all aspects
(outbound and inbound) of a purely domestic imputation system in the European (E.U./EEA) context.
Several other countries, European, such as Ireland and
Belgium, and non European, such as Japan and Singapore,
also replaced imputation with various versions of partial (or
full) dividend tax exemption systems.
6.

The E.U.

Although not another "country," the E.U. played a central
role in the current trend away from imputation, as apparent
from the above review. There is no European harmonized income tax, a minori ad majus a corporate tax. Nonetheless, as
early as 1966, an expert group recommended the extension of
imputation credits to foreign income,8 6 and in 1975, the European Commission proposed a directive, never adopted and
83. See, e.g., Gunnar Westerlund & Tomi Karsio, Finnish Government Introduces Major Tax Reform Package, 2004 WTD 102-2, May 26, 2004.
84. Case E-1/04 Fokus BankJudgment of November 23, 2004, available at
http://www.dinesider.no/customer/770660/archive/files/Decided%20
Cases/2004/eI_- 04decision-e.pdf.
85. Frederick Zimmer, EFTA Court Strikes Down Norwegian Withholding Tax
on Dividends, 2004 WTD 229-3, Nov. 29, 2004, and Frederick Zimmer, Norwegian Government Proposes Tax Reform Legislation, 2004 WTD 201-1, Oct. 18,
2004.
86. Memorandum of the Commission to the Council of 26 June 1967,
BULL. OF THE EUR. ECON. COMMUNITY, Supplement to Bulletin No. 8-1967.
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withdrawn in 1990, to harmonize the corporate tax in Europe
through a partial imputation system.8 7 A 1970 study, however,
recommended to the commission to prefer the classical system
as the basis for E.U. tax harmonization due to its neutrality
and simplicity. 88 Although none of the above has ever been

acted upon, the latter approach effectively prevailed through
the jurisprudence of the ECJ, culminating in its Manninen decision, 9 which effectively prohibits the use of an imputation
system if it is not extended in full across-borders. As previously
mentioned, this approach, based on non-discrimination logic,
has been a material factor in the trend away from imputation
explored by this article.
7.

Canada, Australia & New Zealand

Finally, some countries did not get discouraged by the difficulties of implementing imputation across-borders. 90 Canada, for instance, adopted integration as early as 1949. A
modern partial imputation system, not available for cross-border investments, was introduced in 1972, and extended as of
1978, with efficiency benefits as its primary objective. 9 1 Despite the lack of strong evidence supporting the effectiveness
of this system in Canada, which, in part was due to reasons
unrelated to integration itself, the partial integration system
has been retained. The benefits of integration are generally
not extended across borders, and nevertheless, are not impacted by the nondiscrimination provisions in Canada's tax
92
treaties.
Australia is still one of the keenest devotees of integration.
In 1987 it adopted a full imputation system, 93 which employs a
87. Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the harmonization of
systems of company taxation and of withholding taxes on dividends of 5 November 1975, 1975 OJ. (253) 2. .
88. A. J. Van den Tempel, Corporation Tax and Individual Income Tax
in the European Communities, Commission Studies, Competition - Approximation of Legislation Series no. 15, Brussels, 1970.
89. 'Manninen,supra note 82.
90. There are even new adoptions of imputation systems, such as in Taiwan's.
91. Satya N. Poddar, Canada, in IMPUTATION SYSTEMS - OBJECTIVES AND
CONSEQUENCES, 36TH CONGRESS IFA MONTREAL 22 (1983).
92. Mark Brender & PennyJ. Woolford, Canada, 86A STUD. ON INT'L FisCAL L. 235, 238 (2003).
93. Taxation Laws Amendment Act, No. 2 (1987) (Austl).
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corporate tax at a flat rate equal to the top marginal individual
rate, with any distributions out of taxed corporate earnings
"franked" (i.e. Reflect the tax paid at the corporate level) and
carry a credit for the use of the distribute shareholder against
her basic tax liability. 9 4 The only benefit for foreign shareholders is the elimination of the withholding tax on franked
dividends. Non-portfolio foreign dividends are largely exempt. Australia does not typically include a nondiscrimination
article in its treaties, so it was not under pressure to equalize
dividend tax treatment across borders on this ground.
Together with Mexico and New Zealand, Canada and Aus95
tralia provide examples of important international players
that did not join the trend and hanged on to imputation. Of
course, it was easier for them to do that because they were not
exposed to the internal E.U. Pressures. Such pressures unquestionably accelerated this trend; yet, this article argues
there were other reasons to this trend, primarily the insufficient coordination of international tax policies. The next section begins to explore this argument.
D.

A Turn of Events with the Turn of the Century

Neither the adoption of imputation, nor its recent reversals were universal. 9 6 Moreover, despite the dominance of the
leading European countries in both these trends, they were
not alone generating them. At the same time that most of
their trade partners adopted integration, both the U.S. And
the Netherlands resisted reform. In the U.S., several studies
have recommended integration,9 7 mainly for efficiency rea94. See Graeme S. Cooper & Sandra M. Lanigan, Australia, 86A STUD. ON
FiscAL L. 131 (2003), for a more comprehensive description of the
system.
95. Especially from U.S. perspective.
96. As the last paragraph indicates.
97. The most important of which are: the 1977 Treasury proposal on
imputation system (See McLure, supra note 2, at 227-230); the 1981 Prof.
Andrews ALI dividend deduction proposal (See William D. Andrews, The ALI
Reporter's Proposal on Corporate Distributionsand Corporate Taxation with a Personal Consumption Tax, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 333 (1981)); the 1992 Treasury
and the 1993 ALI proposals (See GRAETZ AND WARREN, supra note 2); and the
former proposals reviewed by David Tillinghast (See David Tillinghast, The
USA Reort, in INTERNATIONAL FIsCAL ASSOCIATION, IMPUTATION SYSTEMS OBJECTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES, at 51, 52 (IFA Congress Seminar Series No.
7, 1982)).
INT'L
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sons, but it had never materialized. The main reasons for the
political resistance were the predicted revenue losses and the
resistance of the corporate sector.9 8 There was also the general perception that integration was hard to sell to the public
since it was perceived as a break for the rich and fat, non-tax
paying corporations.9 9 The Dutch resisted for similar reason,
mainly taking into account the major foreign shareholding in
the large Dutch corporations. They figured out that such a
large group of investors could not be denied a benefit their
own residents enjoyed. Granting imputation credits to all
shareholders was out of the question, both because of sheer
revenue loss reasons and reluctance to transfer the real benefit
to foreign fiscs. This is still the, somewhat unique, Dutch position. The U.S., however, in a surprising move, adopted a reduced dividend tax rate system, equalizing it to the tax rate for
capital gains and setting it at 15%.100 The reduced rate applies also to dividends paid by most foreign corporations. 10 1
The declared goals of this reform were economic stimulus and
growth (through the capture of, inter alia, the efficiency benefits of integration). 102
As mentioned in section II.C., other reforms, reaching
similar ends, although opposite in direction, were passed in
the last five years by most of the prominent imputation jurisdictions: the U.K., Germany, France, etc. 10 3 In short, imputation abruptly lost its appeal as the favorite integration method
and has consistently been replaced by the less accurate reduced dividend tax rate system, which, in a way, is a hybrid of
98. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, the Proper Way to

Eliminate the Corporate Tax, 27 TAx NOTES 637, 639 (May 6, 1985).
99. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 187.
100. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.

108-27, I.R.C. § 302 (2003).
101. Notice 2004-70, 2004-44 I.R.B. 724.
102. But see Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Have I got a Dealfor You! Analyzing the Dividend Exclusion, Tax Analysts, Doc. 2003-2527 (quoting, among
others, Paul Krugman, calling the reform: "The Tax Complication Act of
2003," and arguing that it will provide "stimulus for lawyers"). The desirability of the Act or the candor of the administration promoting it are beyond

the scope of this article.
103. See supra Part I.C., and Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1600. (The author
criticizes the Bush administration's tax reform; an appendix, authored by
Yoram Keinan provides an excellent review of some of the relevant develop-

ments).
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dividend exclusion and the classical system. This raises the
question whether a progression towards convergence of these
tax systems is on the horizon. 10 4 Although answering this
question in full is beyond the scope of this article, some developments in this direction laid the ground for this article's argument that revival of imputation through enhanced international cooperation is feasible.
Note also that in many cases the benefits of integrations
could not be captured due to negating policies (Germany,
France, Italy, etc.), such as deferral and strict foreign currency
controls. Although not explicitly articulated, it is not hard to
understand that imputation suffered due to its sensitivity to
the effects of such extraneous policies. One may argue that
this supports the argument that imputation is inferior to other
methods and should therefore be replaced. This, of course, is
not an inevitable conclusion - if integration benefits exceed
the benefits of these other policies it may be reasonable to prefer its retention rather than an awkward "survival of the fittest"
mode of norms coordination. There is no indication that such
a benefits-evaluation study had been made in any of these
countries prior to their repeal of imputation. Moreover, some
of these contradicting policies, such as foreign currency controls, have been phased out in recent years for other reasons
anyway.
III.
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF INTEGRATION AS A PRIMARY

EXPLANATION OF CuRRENT TAX POLICY TRENDS

It is sometimes hard to comprehend that international
constraints force us to change our long-standing policies, especially when we do not have reason to believe that these policies
are wrong "for us." This is particularly true in the tax discourse, since tax has always been perceived as a major factor in
the sovereignty of nation states as we know them. However,
the power of these international constraints in the international tax area, most notably in the more open economies, is
significant, and may become decisive with economic globalization. The constant decline (and convergence) in worldwide
corporate tax rates in the last twenty years is a classic example
for that - governments with different needs and priorities feel
104. See Vann, supra note 6, at 69.
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10 5
bound by the current range of acceptable rates.

A.

Introduction: The InternationalDimension of Imputation

This article argues, as aforesaid, that a very similar process
played a major role in the reversal of the almost universal
trend of adopting integration in general and imputation in
particular in the 21st century. The following tables depict the
difficulty of plainly extending the benefits of imputation
across borders. Table III (A) uses the same basic example used
in Part II to demonstrate the consequences of unilaterally extending imputation credits to foreign taxes borne by domestic
investors, and some policy options that may assist in alleviating
these consequences.
TABLE

III(A)
Imputation

Investor country
Domestic
investment

Credit granted
to foreign
investments

Plus no
withholding
tax at source

Plus gross-tip
for foreign
corporate tax

100
35
65

100
35
65

100
35
65

100
35
65

-

9.75

0

0

100
40
35
-

65
26
35/65=22.75
9.75

65
26
35/65=22.75
0

100
40
35
0

5
-

0
6.5

3.25
-

5
-

Total tax
Shareholder income after tax
Revenue split

40
60

44.75
55.25

38.25
61.75

40
60

Source country share

-

35

35

Residence country share

40

44.75
0 (plus 6.5
excess credit)

3.25

5

Source countr

10 6

Corporate income
35% corporate tax
After-tax corporate income
Withholding tax if distributed
(15%)
Residence country
Dividend (grossed up)
40% Individual tax
Imputation credit
Foreign tax credit
Residual residence country
tax
Excess credit
Result

KPMG, Press Release, KPMG Corporate Tax Rate Survey for 2004
105. See, e.g.,
- Rates Still Falling (May 3, 2004), available at http://www.kpmg.ca/en/
(hereinafter "KPMG renews/documents/CorpTaxRateSurvey2004.pdf
port").
106. 106. For these purposes it does not matter whether the source
country has a classical, imputation or reduced rate system - all result in
similar consequences.
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The comparison of the first and second column demonstrates the most direct and acute consequence - simply extending (unilaterally) imputation credits for foreign taxes results in no revenue to the imputation residence country. It
may even result in a transfer to the fisc of another country if
excess credit, similar to the one in the example, is allowed to
be used. Moreover, even now CEN is not typically met because
the source country's share is larger than the total level of domestic taxation in an imputation country (44.75 v. 40 in the
above example). The results are less harsh if the source country agreed to elimination of the withholding tax on dividends.
In that case, the source country keeps just its corporate level
tax, and the imputation residence country collects the difference between the source country's corporate tax rate and its
individual rate. For that to work, the residence imputation
country needs to gross-up the dividend amount to reflect the
foreign corporate tax paid as demonstrated by the third and
fourth columns above. If that were the case, the imputation
residence country could maintain CEN and potentially collect
some tax in these circumstances. Note, however, that for this
to be realistic source countries must give up their withholding
tax on dividends 0 7 and cooperate with the residence imputation system at a level that would make the above gross-up
mechanism feasible. Effective sharing of information - more
effective than anything we have at the present - is crucial for
this mechanism to succeed.
Table III(B) complements Table III(A) with the consequences of extending imputation benefits to foreign investors
in domestic (imputation country) corporations. One possible
way of achieving that is for the imputation country to unilaterally eliminate its own withholding tax on dividend income.
The consequences of that are demonstrated in the first two
columns:

107. As elaborated on below, this is not a far-fetched possibility. See infra
Part W.A.
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TABLE

Investor country

III1(B)

Classical

WHT
WHT
elimination elimination

Imputation
Plus Credit Plus gross-up
granted to
for foreign
foreign
corporate
investments
tax

Source country (Imputation)
Corporate income
35% corporate tax
After-tax corporate income
Withholding tax if distributed
(15%)
Residence country
Dividend (grossed up)
40% Individual tax

65
26

65
26

-

-

65
26
35/
65=22.75

-

-

0

26

26

3.25

Result
Total tax
Shareholder income after tax

61
39

61
39

38.25
61.75

Revenue split
Source country share
Residence country share

35
26

35
26

35
3.25

Imputation credit
Foreign tax credit
Residual residence country
tax
Excess credit

Under current rules, this policy option works well with
classical (or reduced rate) 108 country investors,' 0 9 but not with
imputation country investors. If, however, the residence imputation country implemented the relief rules described in Table
III(A), potentially acceptable results could be achieved.1 10
Neutrality would basically be achieved (ignoring rate differences) "'1for both residence and source countries. Again, this
is not the result under current rules, which creates a (tax) bias
108. Reduced rate country investors face similar consequences to classical
country investors, only their residence tax level is lower, and consequently
the residence country share is lower.
109. CEN is basically maintained in the classical country, and its share of
tax acceptably reflect its individual (dividend) tax rate.
110. Of course, for that to be possible, both elimination of withholding
taxes on dividend income and an effective sharing of information are required. See Ault, supra note 15, at 581-82.
111. Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of InternationalInvestment Income, 94 Q. J. ECON. 793, 796 (1980).
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against cross-border corporate investment involving imputation countries.
As already explored, the purpose of integration is to enhance the neutrality of the tax system, by removing tax wedges
from decisions to invest or do business through corporations
or otherwise. In the international setting, however, integration, and especially its most popular form, the imputation system, actually frustrated the neutrality of tax systems from an
allocative efficiency perspective by favoring domestic investment over foreign investment, as demonstrated in the above
simple example.
This difficulty has been known for some
11 2
years now.
B.

Nondiscrimination and Imputation

An extremely interesting footnote written by Professor
Richard Bird twenty years ago states: "there is no case for concluding that the international tail (nondiscrimination) should
necessarily wag the domestic dog (integration)."1 1

3

As should

be apparent by now, while this article supports this conclusion
in principle, reality proved it wrong, at least for now - nondiscrimination international obligations of countries crippled imputation, almost eradicating it in Europe. Professor Bird
made the above conclusion in a discussion of international equity implications of integration. Without ruling one way or another regarding the significance of international equity considerations or whether imputation should be affected by such
considerations, this article takes nondiscrimination obligations
of countries to be what they are - international obligations of
all the countries involved. It is quite straightforward that by
extending the benefits of integration to domestic investment
by domestic investors only, these countries violate their international obligations. These obligations meant much more in
the E.U., where they were important structural fundamentals
112. See, e.g., Richard M. Bird, InternationalAspects of Integration, 28 NAT'L
TAxJ. 302, 306-09 (1975); Robin Boadway & Neil Bruce, Problems with Integrating Corporate and PersonalIncome Taxes in an Open Economy, 48 J. PUB.
ECON 39, 56-62 (1992); Richard J. Vann, InternationalImplications of Imputation, 2 AUSTL. TAX F. 451, 496 (1985) (acknowledging these difficulties in the

context of Australia's contemplation of adopting its imputation system).
113. Bird, supra note 113, at 310 n.26.
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in the creation of the single market, and indeed, as is wellknown by now, the European assault succeeded.
In most countries, the technical nature of the nondiscrimination obligations contributed to the repeal of imputation
and the adoption of the reduced rate system. The reduced
rates system has been successful in maintaining neutrality, yet
at the expense of overall higher tax rates on both domestic
and international investment. Two immediate results of these
higher tax rates could be the loss of some efficiency gains and
an increased incentive to take advantage of deferral opportunities. 114 All the distortions attributed to the classical system
persist under this system, even if in a lesser form.
These results cannot be desirable. Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom is that the above effect of nondiscrimination
was the primary reason for the repeal of imputation in so
many countries. This conventional wisdom cannot, however,
explain the abruptness and the extent of the policy moves
away from imputation. Nominally, only the Finnish (2003)
and Norwegian (2004) systems were officially condemned,
whereas the major European economies began their reforms
earlier. Moreover, while it is true that the ECJ has only recently started to expand its activism to tax matters, non-discrimination provisions have not changed for many years, and
technically could have been used for many years to assert some
pressure on imputation countries to either extend them
across-borders or to abandon them; this did not happen due
to the lack of sufficient interest for other countries to compel
imputation countries to change their policies - capital importing countries collected their share of tax anyway and capital
export countries attempted to solve some of the situations at
the bilateral level with important counterpart. These attempts
were not very successful in general; in some cases, countries,
such as France, developed certain mechanisms to extend the
benefits of their imputation systems to foreigners in an attempt to attract investments. These attempts, however, were
the exception rather than the rule.

114. This is due to the increased disparity between the corporate tax rate
alone and the effective tax rate (corporate + individual (residual) dividend
tax rate).

NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND BUSINESS

C.

[Vol. 2:51

Imputation in a Non-Cooperative World

Another explanation for the development described thus
far is that, until the late 1990s, international investment was
not voluminous enough for countries to concede what they
considered a desirable policy (imputation). Since countries
acknowledged that the unilateral extension of the benefits of
integration to foreign investment and foreign investors would
amount to a transfer to a foreign fisc, 11 5 they simply kept imputation as a purely domestic policy. This is a classic example
of the revenue flight tension so typical in our globalizing world
- a desirable policy was exposed to risk of cannibalization (of
revenues) by trade partners, and countries therefore preferred
116
a safer, but less desirable tax policy.
Except for some attempts, in certain narrow circum-

stances, no cooperative efforts were made to accommodate imputation at the international level.1 17 The rules of the international tax regime were, and still are, based on the classical system, and the regime itself was premised on reciprocity rather
than coordination of polices - a version of cooperation
through retaliation, so typical to non-cooperative settings." 8
There were basically two alternatives to the exclusive application of imputation: reduction or elimination of dividend withholding taxes by imputation countries in the inbound context
or the implementation of a clearing mechanism that would
govern some agreed-upon revenue sharing in the outbound
context." 19 The former was generally unfair (and therefore
unacceptable) to the imputation country since it gave up revenue that it deserved under the basic principles without any reciprocal concession by its treaty partner. The latter was con20
sidered impossible in the uncooperative environment.
Imputation countries began to realize that even in the exclusively domestic application of imputation world they could
not win. Their investors faced in other countries, even prior
to the application of the domestic tax system, taxes higher
115. See, e.g., supra Table III(A) ("Credit granted to foreign investments").

116. See Brauner, supra note 18 (discussing the revenue flight tension).
117. See Ault, supra note 15, at 581.
118. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD,
(1984).
119. Ault, supra note 15 at 579.
120. Id.
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than the overall effective tax on domestic investment, and
they collected from foreigners taxes higher than those on domestic investors, thus deterring such (especially portfolio) foreign investment. This imbalance was unbearable to both capital exporters and capital importers.
IV.
CONCLUSION:

THE BENEFITS OF INTEGRATION COULD BE

CAPTURED THROUGH ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

A.

Reviving Imputation Through Enhanced
Coordinationis Feasible

To this point, the discussion portrayed the future of integration in quite gloomy colors. This does not have to be the
case. As demonstrated above, and explored for some years
now in the tax literature, the international dimension crippled
imputation, and the resurgence of non-discrimination (particularly of the European expansive version) completed the assault, making it an exceptional oddity in just five years. The
inability of countries to extend the benefits of imputation
across borders was the Achilles heel of the system. The demise
of imputation did not imply the demise of integration, however, as practically all of the countries who repealed imputation replaced it with another tax regime that is designed to
eliminate (alas not completely) double taxation of corporate
profits. 121 The logical conclusion from these developments is,
as acknowledged earlier, 122 that imputation could be saved if it
could be extended across-borders. The purpose of this article
was to explore this possibility. It concludes, next, that some
international tax developments, together with a general (independent of integration) necessity to enhance international tax
policy coordination may present an opportunity for that to
happen.123

One such development, which is not particularly new, is
the convergence of corporate tax rates in most major and
121. Id. (replacing it with either a reduced dividend tax rate system or
dividend expansion).
122. But see Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1600 (concluding that imputation
could not be saved).
123. See Yariv Brauner, An InternationalTax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX
L. REV. 259, 291-93 (2003).
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other important economies. 124 This convergence of the constantly declining rates presents an opportunity for integration 12 5 because taxing international income in a rational way is
much easier when international corporate tax rates are at
roughly the same level. 126 In our case, it ensures a certain minimum level of taxation for the source country (35% in our example, which should be generally realistic, if not a bit high);
minimal level does not imply a low tax share, since this "bite"
should generally be very significant in comparison to the maximal level of taxation which an imputation country wishes to
impose on investment in corporations overall (40% in our example). Further, it means that the country in which the business is conducted primarily taxes its profits, and the investor
(residence) country is left only with a small margin of potential taxation if it wishes to adhere to integration. Finally, any
reference to the tax collected at the corporate level by the
source country should be easier once rates and maybe even
base rules converge.
A more recent development is the willingness of some
countries, primarily the U.S., to eliminate (reduce to zero)
their withholding tax on dividend income paid to foreigners.
Such elimination is gradual, applied only to direct investors
(not portfolio) through a handful of reciprocal bilateral tax
treaties. However, these treaties now "cover" a significant portion of international investment. 27 The effect of elimination
of dividend withholding taxes can be seen in Tables 111(a) and
111(b). Reciprocal elimination of withholding taxes alone does
not reduce the total tax - it just changes the revenue share,
leaving more revenue to the residence country. This mere revenue flight cannot be acceptable, standing alone, and is not
desirable as it does not integrate the systems; however, it
presents an opportunity for imputation countries to extend
imputation benefits across-borders. This ensures that the overall tax does not exceed its top individual rate and still even
collect a minimal tax. A classical country gives away withhold124. See KPMG report, supra note 105, at 1.
125. This article assumes that integration, if adopted, will be at the shareholder rather than the corporate level.
126. Ault, supra note 15, at 566; see also supra note 103 and accompanying
text.
127. See Ault, supra note 15, at 567, 568 (referencing in the U.S. context,
the treaties with the U.K., Australia, the Netherlands, and Mexico).
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ing tax on inbound investments, yet it benefits from the reciprocal elimination of withholding taxes in the imputation country, resulting in a larger share of revenue on outbound investment. A cost/benefit analysis of each bilateral situation
should result in different balances, yet adjustments could be
made in each case without much complication if the countries
cooperate at a high enough level. A major difficulty for this
article is that some countries, including the U.S., do not currently eliminate the withholding tax on dividends to portfolio
investors. Several commentators in various occasions exposed
the futility of this policy. 128 Although not clear, it is not inconceivable that countries will eventually abolish this withholding
tax or reduce it from its OECD recommended level of 15%
through enhanced international cooperation.
To complete the picture, economic globalization challenges the currently stable international tax regime to adapt to
the proliferation of international business and investment as
economies open. Enhanced cooperation and coordination of
tax policies is the key for successful evolvement of this regime
and the maintenance of its stability. 129 Specifically for the purposes of this article, the current international tax regime is
premised on the basis of the classical system, as demonstrated
above. 13 0 Changing that does not require deconstruction of a
type that should threaten the stability of the regime, because it
is still based on the basic principles of this regime: the source
country primarily taxes business income and the residence
country gets the residual taxing right, reciprocity is generally
kept as the fundamental rule, although in some cases countries could agree to divert from strict reciprocity if the communication line between the treaty parties would be kept open.
Preferably, it would be made better, requiring a more effective
exchange of information, for instance.
There are some additional challenges to this model proposal. One obvious challenge is the interference of tax
havens. Their impact, however, is not different than under
the current regime, although in a world without dividend withholding taxes countries may need to be more careful in curb128. See, e.g., Kees van Raad, Commentary Approaches to Internationally Integrated Taxation of Distributed CorporateIncome, 47 TAX L. REv. 613, 619 (1992).
129. Brauner, supra note 124, at 325.
130. See, e.g., Ault, supra note 15, at 569-70.
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ing tax haven based tax evasion. A more concerning challenge
may be that some typical capital importing countries hang on
to source taxation as a primary source of revenue. The analysis of the desirability of this approach is beyond the scope of
this article. Nonetheless, such insistence should not present a
prohibitive challenge to the proposed solution model since in
most of these countries it should not be necessary for jumpstarting such an attempt, and, anyway, their needs could be
met in a separate arrangement. They will, however, face increased pressure to open their economies due to competition
over capital from countries that will subscribe to the new regime (and reduce or eliminate their dividend withholding
taxes).
Despite all of the above, countries did not choose to take
this path, but rather chose to replace imputation with an integration system that is not perfect, yet easier to implement in
this world. This concern raises the question of incentives, or
how (and if) this proposal could materialize.
B.

Reviving Imputation through Enhanced Coordination
is Probably Desirable

Advocating a solution model that opposes the direction of
the actual behavior of countries requires one to carry a heavy
burden in an attempt to prove its desirability. Moreover, in
our case, leading experts consider the practical benefits of integration in general and imputation in particular rather minor.1 3 ' Doubters argue that in most cases the biases created by
the classical system are mitigated by other provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code that provide self-help options to corporations, and that corporations who choose not to take advantage of these opportunities do not require legal protection.
The debt/equity bias goes the argument is not even solved by
integration - only mitigated at best. Finally, economic analysis
did not reach consensus regarding some key aspects of taxation of corporate profits - most importantly the real incidence
of the corporate tax and whether the tax on dividends affects
stock prices, 132 and therefore some of the theoretical benefits
of integration remain doubtful.
131. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 6.
132. This is the famous old v. new view of dividend taxation. See, e.g., Alan
Auerbach, Taxation and Corporate FinancialPolicy, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUB.
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The two first hurdles are, of course, related, since the
doubts about the benefits of integration in the international
setting led to the policy reversals. Note, however, that even if
this was the rational choice in the current international environment, it does not mean that the efficiency benefits of integration should be ignored. The fact that they are mitigated in
many cases, such as those described above, does not mean that
they are not significant enough to justify a reform such as the
one suggested in this article.
Regarding the debt/equity bias, the argument is that this
bias is not unique to the corporate tax regime, but rather a
problem of the income tax as such.' 3 3 This is true, yet integration mitigates the bias, and therefore seems superior to a classical system from this perspective. Others proposed to keep the
classical system as "a global means of tax harmonization," with
the slight adjustment of double-taxing interest income (disallowing the interest expense deduction) to equate its treatment
with dividend income.1 34 This proposal does seem to present
a politically more likely reform than the one proposed in this
article, apart from its theoretical undesirability; moreover, it
requires international cooperation of a similar degree - a requirement that casts further doubt about its superiority.
The two unresolved theoretical economic debates do cast
doubt on the benefits of integration. This should not, however, discourage an otherwise desirable attempt to enhance international cooperation on tax matters. Further, once an international tax organization is formed, for instance, this doubt
should not discourage the major economies from considering
the suggestions of this article, since it is hard to imagine that
any outcome of these debates will result in the classical system
being more efficient, and since there are no normative justifi(Alan Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, eds., 2003). These views are
traditionally associated with: Martin Feldstein, Corporate Taxation and Dividend Behavior, 37 REv. ECON. STUDIEs 57 (1970) (discussing the old view);
Alan Auerbach, Wealth Maximization and the Cost of Capital,93 Q.J. ECON. 433
(1979); and David F. Bradford, The Incidence and Allocation Effects of a Tax on
Corporate Distributions, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1981) (discussing the new view).
133. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1601 n.17 (referring to Alvin C. Warren Jr., FinancialContract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REv.
460 (1993)).
134. Kari & Yld-Liedenpohja, supra note 40.
ECON.
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cations for the classical system except for alleged lower administrative costs.
C.

The Importance of Reviving Imputation
through Enhanced Coordination

Dividend yields have been declining in the last decades
and are currently low worldwide.13 5 Moreover, the vast economic literature analyzing dividend policy in general and the
effect of dividend taxation on corporate decisions continues to
evolve with no clear consensus. Recent studies indicate, however, that even if taxes have some effect on the decision to
distribute dividends it is only minor, 13 6 and may be significant
only in the case of a small number of corporations.1 37 This
reality does cast doubt on the practical desirability of diverting
efforts and resources to the reform suggested in this article.
In conclusion, the suggested reform is both feasible and
desirable if countries choose to adopt it in concert. Its biggest
hurdle is that there is probably no imputation country that is
economically strong enough to begin the process of international extension of imputation through enhanced cooperation, even if all remaining imputation countries combined
forces. Absent an international organization's effort it does
not seem to be realistic. The OECD or any of its larger economies do not have sufficient interest injumpstarting the process
and an international tax organization is, alas, still in the works.
In addition, the magnitude of the gains from such an effort is
doubtful, and therefore, it is hard to say if such an effort is
worthwhile for now.

135. See, e.g.,

RAj CHETTY & EMMANUEL SAEz, DIVIDEND TAXES AND CORPO-

2003 DIVIDEND TAX CUT (Centre for
Econ. Pol'y Res., Discussion Paper No. 4722, 2004), availableat http://www.
cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=4722 (noting the exception of a
slight increase in the post-JGTRRA U.S.).
136. See, e.g., ALON BRAY ET AL., PAYOUT POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=358582.
137. Even then, the effect was accounted for only when a significant and
abrupt tax rate reduction was enacted. See, e.g., CHETrY & SAz, supra note
135.
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